Pomponazzi and Aquinas on the Intellective Soul by Eberl, Jason T.
© 2005 The Modern Schoolman 83(1): 65-77. 
Pomponazzi and Aquinas on the Intellective Soul 
Jason T. Eberl 
Introduction 
 One of Thomas Aquinas’s primary philosophical concerns is to provide an 
account of the nature of a human soul.  He bases his account on Aristotle’s De anima 
[DA], wherein Aristotle gives an account of “soul” (psuchē) as divided into three distinct 
types:  vegetative, sensitive, and intellective.  Aristotle defines an intellective soul as 
proper to human beings and the only type of soul that may potentially exist separated 
from a material body.1  Aquinas argues that an intellective soul is indeed separable from 
its body and conceives of it as essentially, or unqualifiedly (simpliciter), immortal and 
separable from its body, and relatively (secundum quid) mortal and conjoined to its body.  
Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), a Renaissance philosopher concerned with ridding neo-
Aristotelianism of Platonic or Averroistic influences, criticizes Aquinas’s account as not 
being properly Aristotelian and having been influenced by Platonism.2  In this paper, I 
will present summaries of Aquinas’s arguments concerning an intellective soul’s essential 
immortality, as well as Pomponazzi’s criticisms of Aquinas’s position.  I then propose 
ways in which Aquinas may respond to these criticisms.    
Aquinas’s Arguments for an Intellective Soul’s Immortality3 
Aquinas follows Aristotle in holding that an intellective soul is the substantial 
form of a human being.  As a substantial form, an intellective soul is responsible for (1) a 
human being’s existence (esse), (2) the actualization of the matter that constitutes a 
human being, and (3) the unity of existence and activity in a human being.4  Aquinas 
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further argues that an intellective soul has a mode of being that distinguishes it from all 
other substantial forms of material substances.5  This distinction is due to intellective 
functioning not being dependent upon any material organ.  Aquinas, again following 
Aristotle, holds that intellective activity surpasses the limits of matter in its understanding 
the universal, intelligible forms of things; such universal forms are the natures of things 
understood as abstracted from any particular material conditions—e.g., understanding the 
concept “humanity” instead of just this human being.  Since intellective activity surpasses 
the limits of individuated matter, no purely material process can be responsible for the 
generation of substantial forms with the capacity for such activity.  All other substantial 
forms of material substances can be generated through purely material processes.  
Aquinas thus argues that an intellective soul has its esse directly from God,6 and is 
something both incorporeal and subsistent on its own.7   
That an intellective soul is subsistent and incorporeal, Aquinas argues, implies its 
incorruptibility, i.e., its immortality.  Aquinas notes that something can be corruptible in 
two ways:  per se—through itself—and per accidens—through another.  No substantial 
form is corruptible per se, because corruption per se involves the separation of a thing 
from its substantial form.  A substantial form cannot separate from itself.  Hence, since an 
intellective soul is a substantial form, it is not corruptible per se.  Substantial forms of 
material things, however, such as a rock, are corruptible per accidens.  Material 
substantial forms are corruptible per accidens, because they are completely dependent for 
their subsistence and operation upon the bodies they inform.  When such bodies are 
corrupted, their substantial forms are corrupted as well.  An intellective soul is an 
exception.  Though it is the substantial form of a material body, an intellective soul has 
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its esse directly from God and also has an operation, viz., intellective cognition, which 
does not depend upon any bodily organ for its functioning.  Therefore, an intellective soul 
cannot be corrupted either per se, as is the case with any substantial form, or per 
accidens, due to its lack of complete dependence upon a material body for its subsistence 
and operation.8 
 Some capacities of an intellective soul, viz., its vegetative and sensitive capacities, 
do act through bodily organs.  Thus, it is not the case that an intellective soul is 
completely independent of its body; for some of its functions must be exercised through 
bodily organs.  Hence, an intellective soul’s separable existence does not entail that all of 
its capacities can be actualized in such a state.  An intellective soul requires a material 
body to function completely, i.e., for all of its capacities to be actualizable.  Furthermore, 
Aquinas argues that an intellective soul communicates its esse to a material body such 
that there is one esse of a composite substance: a human being.  As a result, an 
intellective soul must be immediately conjoined to its body.9  Additionally, while 
intellective activity does not itself require a bodily organ,10 an intellect operates by 
abstracting universal forms from “phantasms” (phantasmata).11  An intellect has such 
phantasms through sense-perception of particular material substances.12  Since the 
activity of sense-perception requires proper bodily organs—eyes, ears, nose, brain, etc.—
an intellect does have need of a material body, at least initially.13  It thus appears that, 
while Aquinas does not himself use these terms, Pomponazzi is correct in ascribing to 
Aquinas the position that an intellective soul is essentially (simpliciter) immortal, due to 
its distinctive intellective function not requiring a bodily organ to operate, and relatively 
(secundum quid) mortal in that it naturally exists conjoined to a corruptible material body 
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for the sake of its vegetative and sensitive operations, as well as for the intellect to be 
provided with phantasms from which it may abstract intelligible forms. 
Pomponazzi’s Critique of Aquinas’s Position 
 In his Tractatus de immortalitate animae (1516),14 Pomponazzi puts forth two 
criteria by which previous arguments for an intellective soul’s immortality, viz., those of 
Averroes and Aquinas, ought to be judged.  The first criterion is that propositions 
concerning an intellective soul’s immortality ought to be formed “leaving aside 
revelation and miracle, and remaining entirely within natural limits.”15  The second 
criterion requires the propositions asserted to be properly “Aristotelian.”16  Pomponazzi 
then proceeds to demonstrate how Aquinas’s account of an intellective soul’s immortality 
fails to meet these criteria.17   
First, Aquinas’s argument for an intellective soul being properly immortal and 
relatively mortal can be used to prove the opposite to be the case.  Pomponazzi contends 
that, just as an intellective soul’s operation of receiving all material forms, not using a 
bodily organ, and aspiring to eternal things18 may be employed in an attempt to 
demonstrate its immortality, its not being able to receive all material forms in its 
vegetative part, its use of bodily organs in sensation, and its pursuit of temporal things 
may be used to demonstrate its mortality.  Pomponazzi’s contention, though, shows 
merely that there are two possible conclusions regarding an intellective soul’s nature:  
either it is essentially immortal and relatively mortal, as Aquinas argues, or vice versa, as 
Pomponazzi argues, and “the argument for one conclusion seems to be no stronger than 
for the other.”19   
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In his second criticism, Pomponazzi supports the latter conclusion through an 
additional argument that, since an intellective soul tends, in its capacities, more towards 
the mortal than the immortal, it is more properly considered as mortal:  “[Human] 
existence is more sensuous than intellective, more mortal than immortal.”20  Among the 
reasons Pomponazzi provides for this conclusion is the following: 
For if we consider the number of powers in man, we find only two which attest to 
immortality, the intellect and the will; but innumerable powers of the sensitive 
and vegetative soul, which all attest to mortality.21 
 Pomponazzi’s third criticism is that it is not immediately known that an 
intellective soul is immortal, and there is no evidence of such immortality that is not 
contradicted by some necessary condition of an intellective soul.  For example, the 
necessity of imagination for understanding, by providing phantasms for intellectual 
abstraction, contradicts the idea that an intellective soul can come to know things in a 
separated state.  Pomponazzi notes that Aristotle says something similar by first asserting 
a conditional, “If [intellective understanding] too is a kind of imagination, or at least is 
dependent upon imagination, even this cannot exist apart from the body,”22 and later 
affirming the antecedent, “the soul never thinks without a mental image 
(phantasmatos).”23    
Pomponazzi’s fourth criticism asserts the conclusion drawn from the above 
consideration:  “If the human soul is dependent in all its operations on some organ, it is 
inseparable and material; but in all its operations it is dependent on some organ; hence it 
is material.”24  Pomponazzi reinforces an intellective soul’s essential mortality by 
reference to Aristotle’s definition of it, adopted by Aquinas, “as the first actuality of a 
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natural body potentially possessing life.”25  I will consider this criticism in more detail in 
the next section.   
 Pomponazzi’s fifth criticism of Aquinas’s position is that, if an intellective soul is 
truly sensitive and vegetative, then after separation from its body it either has the power 
to perform its sensitive and vegetative functions or it does not.  Pomponazzi states that if 
the former were true, then those capacities would be in vain since a separated soul has the 
use of no organs, which are necessary for the actualization of vegetative and sensitive 
capacities.  But, if the latter were true, then the soul would be deprived of its natural 
capacities for all eternity, which Pomponazzi considers to be absurd.  In his final 
criticism, Pomponazzi states that Aristotle himself concludes26 that an intellective soul is 
essentially corruptible and relatively incorruptible.27 
Thomistic Response to Pomponazzi     
 Having outlined Pomponazzi’s six criticisms of Aquinas’s position that an 
intellective soul is essentially immortal and relatively mortal, I turn now to address each 
criticism from the perspective of Aquinas’s overall account of human nature.  I intend to 
respond to Pomponazzi’s criticisms in a Thomistic fashion in order to preserve both the 
rational foundation of Aquinas’s account and its properly Aristotelian character. 
 As noted above, Pomponazzi’s second criticism is supportive of his first in 
concluding that human nature is “more sensuous than intellective” and thus “more mortal 
than immortal” against Aquinas’s contention that an intellective soul is essentially 
immortal.  Both criticisms can thus be overcome if it can be shown that human nature 
does not tend more towards the sensitive and mortal than the intellective and immortal.  
Such a demonstration can be made given Aquinas’s hierarchical account of reality and 
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the capacities reflective of the various types of soul that inform various grades of life.28  
Following Aristotle,29 Aquinas contends that an intellective soul is the “highest” type of 
soul and contains within its set of capacities those that belong to the “lower” types of 
soul, viz., the sensitive and vegetative.  In comparing intellective capacities to sensitive 
capacities, Aquinas asserts, “the intellective powers are prior to the sensitive powers; 
whence they direct them and command them.”30  Therefore, in a human being, the 
intellect is “more perfect” and has the ability to control certain capacities proper to the 
lower types of soul.  It is due to this hierarchy that one may conclude, in an Aristotelian 
fashion, that a sensitive animal is a higher form of life than a merely vegetative plant, and 
an intellective human being is a higher form of animal life than a dog or a horse.  The 
intellective capacity is qualitatively more significant than the more numerous sensitive 
and vegetative capacities had by a human being informed by an intellective soul. 
 I will next discuss Pomponazzi’s fifth and sixth criticisms and then return to 
consider his third and fourth.  In his fifth criticism, Pomponazzi proposes a dilemma 
regarding the presence of vegetative and sensitive capacities in a separated intellective 
soul:  either a separated intellective soul has such capacities in vain, because it lacks 
bodily organs through which it can exercise them, or it does not have such capacities and 
is thus deprived of its natural condition for all eternity.  Aquinas considers it important 
that an intellective soul maintain the vegetative and sensitive capacities that are proper to 
it.  Aquinas must admit, though, that a separated intellective soul cannot exercise such 
capacities insofar as they depend on bodily organs to operate.  This does not, however, 
imply that a separated intellective soul has such capacities “in vain.”  Aquinas argues that 
it is naturally necessary that a separated intellective soul re-inform its body at some point.  
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Re-informing its body allows an intellective soul to exercise once again its vegetative and 
sensitive capacities.  Aquinas holds that an intellective soul cannot remain perpetually in 
a separated state, since such a state is unnatural for it: 
It must be that a state in which the soul is separated from the body is per accidens 
and contrary to nature, if the soul naturally and per se longs to be united to the 
body.  Hence, the soul will not be separated from the body forever.  Therefore, 
since its substance is incorruptible … it is left open for it to be reunited to the 
body.31 
The souls of human beings are immortal … [but] the soul is naturally united to the 
body, for it is essentially the form of the body.  It is thus contrary to nature for the 
soul to be without the body.  But nothing which is contrary to nature can exist 
forever.  Therefore, the soul will not be without the body forever … Hence, the 
soul’s immortality appears to require the body’s future resurrection.32 
Aquinas concludes that an intellective soul will be rejoined to the body it previously 
informed at some point after death.  The vegetative and sensitive capacities it possesses 
during its separated state thus do not exist in vain. 
 Pomponazzi’s sixth criticism is the charge that Aquinas’s position is not properly 
Aristotelian.  Pomponazzi claims that Aristotle explicitly states in DA that an intellective 
soul is essentially mortal and relatively immortal, in that only one part of it—viz., the 
“active” intellect—is “separable, impassive and unmixed [with a body].”33  
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear precisely what Aristotle intends to assert in the passage 
to which Pomponazzi refers.34  In fact, the difference between the Averroistic and 
Thomistic understandings of Aristotle’s account centers on the interpretation of this 
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passage.  The Latin Averroists took the passage to imply that there is a single active 
intellect, which is essentially immortal, and actualizes the “possible” intellect present in 
each human soul.  Based on this understanding, the Latin Averroists held that the 
intellective soul of individual human beings perishes when the body it informs is 
corrupted; only the universal active intellect persists beyond the death of individual 
human beings.  Aquinas’s interpretation is that there is one intellect present in each 
human being’s soul and this intellect can be understood in two ways:  insofar as it is 
active and thus able to abstract intelligible forms from phantasms, and insofar as it is 
passive and thus able to receive the abstracted intelligible forms.35  It would require 
adjudication of this dispute to determine this passage’s usefulness in supporting 
Pomponazzi’s claim that Aquinas’s account is not properly Aristotelian, and such 
adjudication is outside the scope of this paper.  Suffice it to say that Pomponazzi’s case is 
quite weak if this contentious passage is the only textual evidence he has to support his 
interpretation of Aristotle.         
  I will now consider Pomponazzi’s third and fourth criticisms, which I take as his 
most powerful objections to Aquinas’s position.  In his third criticism, Pomponazzi raises 
the issue of an intellect’s dependence upon phantasms derived from sensation for its 
abstraction of intelligible forms.  Due to this dependence relationship, clearly 
acknowledged by Aristotle and Aquinas,36 Pomponazzi concludes in his fourth criticism 
that an intellective soul is not essentially immortal, because it is (1) dependent upon 
bodily organs for sensation and the production of phantasms, and (2) essentially the 
substantial form of a body according to its definition as a “soul.”  
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Pomponazzi considers the objection that an intellective soul, with respect to its 
intellective function, is not the form of an organic body since intellective activity is not 
the form of any body.  Pomponazzi rejects this contention on the basis that, if such were 
the case, an intellective soul would not be a soul, since it would not be the form of a 
material body.  This would contradict Aristotle’s definition of “soul.”  He also asserts that 
as long as one maintains intellective understanding to be a function of a soul, and a soul, 
by definition, is the form of a body, then there must be a body for it to inform.     
 In response to these points, it may be argued that it is not necessary for an 
intellective soul always to depend on a bodily organ, although it depends initially on one.  
Its apparent dependence is merely an aptitude.  Pomponazzi contends that this response is 
deficient, however.  First, if aptitude alone were enough to satisfy a definition, it would 
follow that something could be called a human being and yet not be a “rational animal,” 
but merely have an aptitude for rationality.37  I respond that an aptitude for rationality is 
sufficient to satisfy definition of a human being.  A newborn child, or a severely mentally 
disabled person, does not actually function as a rational animal.  They operate mainly on 
instinct and in many ways are no more intellectually developed than a brute animal, 
except for the fact that, unlike brutes, children and the severely mentally disabled have an 
inherent aptitude for rationality.  They have not actualized this aptitude due to either a 
lack of development which will come in time (as in the case of children) or an 
impediment which limits the level of development that may be reached (as in the case of 
the severely mentally disabled).  Therefore, since both children and severely mentally 
disabled persons are considered human beings, despite a lack of actual rational 
functioning, an aptitude for rationality must be sufficient to satisfy the definition of a 
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human being.38  Pomponazzi’s analogy is thus improper and does not support his 
contention.   
 Pomponazzi’s second complaint is that an intellective soul’s dependence on 
imagination for phantasms, even if it is only an aptitude, makes it inseparable and 
essentially mortal.  What I willingly grant is that a natural aptitude for utilizing a function 
of a body implies a natural aptitude for being conjoined to that body in order to utilize its 
functions.  But Pomponazzi’s argument requires a stronger premise, one that I do not 
grant:  that an intellect’s aptitude for utilizing imagination implies a necessary connection 
to a body and the intellect’s material existence.  The term “aptitude” refers to a property 
that may be natural, i.e., included in the design of how a subject is to interact with other 
things in the world, but is not necessarily an essential property of the subject as it is in 
itself.  This is what Aquinas argues is the case for an intellective soul.  An intellective 
soul is essentially immaterial and incorruptible.  It is, however, naturally conjoined to a 
body for the sake of actualizing all of its capacities by utilizing bodily organs.  
Pomponazzi’s contention depends on the property of having a natural aptitude to use 
bodily organs, and thereby being conjoined to a body, implying a necessary relationship 
to a body.  It is far from clear, however, that such an implication is valid.  
Aquinas recognizes that an intellective soul’s natural aptitude for understanding 
by means of abstraction from phantasms may imply that a separated intellective soul 
cannot function, which would in turn, following Aristotle, imply its inseparability and 
essential mortality.  Nevertheless, he responds: 
Now the soul has one mode of being when it is united to the body, and another 
when it is separated from the body, yet the soul’s nature remains the same.  It 
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does not follow that its union with the body is accidental, but by reason of its 
nature it is united to the body … Therefore, the soul, according to its mode of 
being when it is united to the body, has a mode of understanding by turning to 
corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from 
the body, it has a mode of understanding by turning to what is simply intelligible, 
just as other separated substances.  Hence, the mode of understanding by turning 
to phantasms is as natural to the soul as its being united to the body; but to be 
separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and similarly to 
understand without turning to phantasms is outside its nature.  And thus it is 
united to the body so that it may exist and operate according to its nature … It is 
thus clear that it is for the sake of the soul’s good that it is united to the body, and 
understands by turning to phantasms; and nevertheless it can exist separated, and 
have another mode of understanding.39 
Aquinas thus concludes that an intellective soul, while it has a natural aptitude for 
understanding by means of sensation and abstraction from phantasms, can also 
understand by another means:  direct access to intelligible forms.40  This mode of 
understanding goes against its natural aptitude, but yet allows for an intellective soul to 
function without a body and thus be essentially immortal.41  Furthermore, Aquinas asserts 
that an intellective soul, once separated from its body, retains the intellectual memory of 
the intelligible forms it had abstracted from phantasms produced from sense-perception 
while embodied.  As a result, a separated intellective soul can engage in “the act of 
knowledge,” which consists of reflection upon the intelligible forms it has already 
received: 
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Therefore, since intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as has been 
stated,42 and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is presently 
[in this life], it follows that through the intelligible species acquired here [in this 
life], the separated soul can understand what it understood prior, but not in the 
same mode, namely by conversion to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a 
separated soul.  And thus the act of knowledge acquired here [in this life] indeed 
remains in the separated soul, but not in the same mode.43 
To understand this claim, and how it is consistent with Aquinas’s contentions that 
an intellect can function on its own without any need of a bodily organ and yet requires 
phantasms received through sensation in order to function naturally, consider the 
following analogy.  A computer’s central processing unit (CPU) has, in itself, the ability 
to process and analyze data, as well as to store and recall it through its RAM and ROM 
capacities.44  It is thus independent in its function and thereby separable from the 
monitor, keyboard, mouse, hard drive, and all other hardware components that constitute 
the whole computer.  The CPU’s RAM and ROM, however, must have data written to 
them for the CPU to process and analyze.  Hence, data input mechanisms such as the 
keyboard, mouse, etc. are required to provide the data for the CPU to store, recall, 
process, and analyze.  So, while the CPU’s definitive function of analyzing and 
processing data, as well as storing and recalling such data, does not require any other 
hardware components, it cannot actually perform this function without having had data 
provided through its input devices.  Once provided, though, those devices may cease to 
exist without depriving the CPU of its functioning.  Thus, a computer as a whole 
functions naturally and optimally when the CPU and other data input devices are present, 
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connected, and functioning together.  If, however, a computer’s CPU could have the data 
it needs to function provided to it in some other fashion, then it could function completely 
on its own without the computer’s other hardware components.  Analogously, an 
informed human body, with its sense organs and brain that provide the faculties of 
sensation and imagination to produce phantasms, is naturally suited to provide such 
phantasms for its soul’s intellect to function.  Nevertheless, with the possibility of direct 
access to intelligible forms and retention of the intelligible forms already received 
through previous acts of sense-perception, a separated intellective soul can function on its 
own, albeit unnaturally and imperfectly, without need of phantasms.    
Pomponazzi further challenges Aquinas’s claim of an intellective soul’s 
separability by arguing that its definition as the substantial form of an organic body 
implies its essential union with such a body.  Pomponazzi thus raises the question:  How 
can something be “the substantial form of X” without there being an X?  In other words, 
if it is definitive of an intellective soul that it be the substantial form of a body, then it 
would seem that there must always be a body which it informs.  Aquinas agrees that an 
intellective soul is, by definition, the form of a body.  Since, however, Aquinas holds that 
an intellective soul is separable from its body, there will be a period of time after 
separation when it is not actually the form of a body.45  According to Pomponazzi, this 
state of affairs is so problematic that an intellective soul should not be considered as 
properly immortal.   
A means of responding to this issue begins with a consideration of an intellective 
soul’s two states of existence—conjoined to a body and separated—in conjunction with 
the notion that an intellective soul’s essential properties need not always be full, or what 
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is often termed by Aristotelian scholars “second,” actualizations.46  As discussed above, a 
mere “potential actualization,” or aptitude, is enough to satisfy the definitional 
requirement of something being an actuality.47   
Aristotle holds that an intellective soul is an actuality and is not actualized by 
anything outside of itself.48  This is not to say that an intellective soul actualizes itself, but 
since its essential nature is as an actuality, it must be actualized at the moment it comes 
into being.  Now, since an intellective soul is immediately conjoined to a body and is an 
actuality by nature, it actualizes its body and also actually thinks while it is conjoined to 
its body.  But there is a question whether both of these characteristics of an intellective 
soul must be actualized for the soul itself to be considered as an actuality.  In other 
words, if an intellective soul actually thinks, it is an actuality, and if it is actually the form 
of a body, it is an actuality.  It seems that only one of these actualizations need occur if an 
intellective soul is to be an actuality.   
When an intellective soul is conjoined to a body, it both actualizes the body and 
actually thinks.  What happens when the body is corrupted and the intellective soul 
separates but continues to exist?  It ceases to be the actual form of a body, for there is no 
longer a body.  But this does not violate the intellective soul’s essential nature as the form 
of a body, for it maintains the potentiality to be the form of that particular body.  On 
Aquinas’s understanding of the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection, a separated 
intellective soul re-actualizes the particular body of which it is the form and first 
actuality.49  The soul re-actualizes the same body, because it maintains in potentia, in its 
separated state, the “blueprint” for that particular body which it had previously informed.  
Because a separated intellective soul maintains, at least potentially, the essential property 
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of being the first actuality of a particular body, Aristotle’s definitional requirement is 
satisfied.  Additionally, an intellective soul maintains its essential nature as an actuality in 
its separated state, because it actually thinks in such a state.50  Therefore, an intellective 
soul both remains an actuality after separation from its body and has a potential, or 
“first,” actualization to be the substantial form of the same body at Resurrection.      
 To summarize the preceding argument, I first claim that on Aristotle’s account 
there are two ways for an intellective soul to be considered an “actuality”:  (1) as a 
thinking thing and (2) as the actualization of a body.  I further claim that an intellective 
soul, both while conjoined to a human body and when separated from it by death, can 
always be characterized in terms of at least one of the above actualities.  When conjoined 
to its body, an intellective soul is both actualizing the body and is actually thinking.  
When separated from its body, an intellective soul still actually thinks; and, surely, as 
Descartes has shown, to think is to actually be.  Finally, I claim that, even at times when 
an intellective soul cannot actually be characterized in terms of one of the above 
actualities, i.e., it is does not possess one of them as a second actualization, it still possess 
it as a first actualization and such is sufficient to satisfy any definitional requirement.  
Therefore, when an intellective soul is not conjoined to its body, it maintains its essential 
nature as something that actually thinks with the potential to be the actuality of a 
particular body. 
Conclusion 
 I conclude that Pomponazzi does not effectively demonstrate that Aquinas’s 
account of an intellective soul being essentially immortal and relatively mortal is either 
not founded on reason alone or not properly Aristotelian.  While some of the Thomistic 
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responses to Pomponazzi I have provided involve the assertion of bodily resurrection, 
Aquinas considers bodily resurrection and the reunion of an intellective soul with its 
body to be metaphysically mandated and not just an event that is provided by divine 
fiat.51  That a separated intellective soul maintains its essential nature as both an actually 
thinking entity and the substantial form of a particular body allows Aquinas to conclude 
that an intellective soul is essentially immortal, due to its intellective capacities that do 
not necessarily require a bodily organ to operate, and relatively mortal, due to its natural 
relationship to a material human body.  Since it is arguable that Aristotle advocates an 
intellect’s separable functioning, as well as its being the form of a material body, permits 
Aquinas’s account to be considered as a valid interpretation of Aristotle’s De anima.52 
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